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Over the last few years there has been an increasing amount of research on the relationship 
between the history and cultures of Qing China and Georgian Britain in what we know of as 
the Age of Romanticism. As this endeavour extends in reach, and expands in scope, our 
previous, and still largely provisional understandings of the subject are inevitably 
problematised and complicated. This essay, like the other in this volume, intends to progress 
perhaps only modestly this ongoing project in my case by exploring the impact of the 1816 
Amherst Embassy to China, which was only the second such royal embassy to reach the 
Forbidden city. This essay will tentatively consider not just some of published accounts the 
embassy generated, but also their publication and reception history, especially with regard to 
that great romantic period publishing house of John Murray. In doing so, I hope to connect 
and develop the insights of travel and book historians, notably, Innes Keighren, Charles 
Withers and Bill Bell’s major study of Murray and exploration, Travels into Print (2015). 
Although the tremendous impact of the first royal embassy to China, that of Viscount 
Macartney of 1792-93, has now been extensively explored, that of its problematic successor 
remains, despite some important recent publications, very much an under explored event. 
While, in many ways, less exciting and glamorous that its predecessor, it is much more  
Two hundred years ago in the early hours of the morning 29 August 1816 (Jiaqing 21), 
William Pitt, Lord Amherst, unrested after travelling overnight, was unceremoniously 
manhandled in an attempt to propel him physically with his two deputies, George Thomas 
Staunton and Henry Ellis, into the presence of the Jiaqing Emperor at the Summer Palace of 
Yuanming Yuan. Exhausted, dirty after an uncomfortable overnight journey and separated 
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from his diplomatic credentials and ambassador’s robes, Amherst and his two deputies 
resisted, leaving the palace in anger. It was reported to the emperor that Amherst’s inability to 
attend the audience was occasioned by an indisposition, as was that of his deputies. The 
emperor, on discovering the diplomatic nature of this evasion, appears angrily, to have 
dismissed the embassy without granting it a ceremonial audience and rejected its “tribute” of 
gifts. Amherst’s party then began their long, overland journey south to Canton (Guangzhou) 
on 28 January 1817. Their ship, the Alceste, refused permission to sail up the Pearl River to 
anchorage at Whampoa, forced its way resulting in an exchange of fire that killed almost fifty 
Chinese (Platt 167-69). The party later suffered shipwreck and attack by Malay pirates on 
their return voyage, before stopping to visit another now former emperor, the deposed 
Napoleon on St Helena. With characteristic realpolitik Napoleon told Amherst he was very 
foolish not to conform to local ceremonial practices and presciently warned against the 
consequences of military action. The embassy arrived back in Britain on 17 August 1817. 
 British accounts, by and large, laid this ostensible “failure” of the embassy to secure 
an imperial audience not on the Jiaqing Emperor (“Kea-king” in their transliteration), but on 
the scheming of certain senior court officials who had unwisely assured him that Amherst had 
practiced and was prepared to perform the ceremony of the full imperial koutou (or ketou both 
Mandarin) or “kowtow” (anglicised) with three kneelings accompanied by three knockings of 
the forehead for each prostration.  The British suspected that Chinese officials had reckoned 
that by compelling an exhausted Amherst into an imperial audience, he would feel himself 
obliged to perform a ceremony that, after much deliberation, he had eventually decided to 
refuse. They also suspected that the viceroy of Canton and his associates had prejudiced the 
court against them (Ellis 422-23; Davis, Sketches 81).  After a process of extended negotiation 
Amherst had offered his Chinese minders a compromise in which he would perform the 
ceremony that the British understood his more famous predecessor, Macartney, had agreed to 
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undertake for the Qianlong Emperor at Jehol in September 1793, kneeling on one knee and 
bowing his head thrice as he would before his sovereign, George III.  Indeed, in an extension 
of the Macartney compromise the ambassador had offered to perform this kneeling not once 
but three times with the full complement of nine bows of the head in total. He also (like 
Macartney) had offered to perform the complete ceremony if either a Chinese court official of 
equal status would kowtow to a portrait of the Prince Regent, or if the emperor would supply 
a written undertaking that any Chinese official appointed to the court of St James in future 
would perform the ceremony in front of a British monarch. The Qianlong Emperor had 
accepted Macartney’s compromise in 1793, yet his fifth son and successor would it seems not. 
Or, at least this is what the British reported as happening. The expensive items brought as  
“presents” for the Jiaqing Emperor, costing some £20,000 were not accepted, though 
afterwards, the requested a limited, symbolic exchange of a few items in his recognition of the 
sincerity and obedience of the Prince Regent in sending this tribute (Kitson “Dark Gift”). The 
issue of the performance of the kowtow remains murky and unclear. Recent scholarships 
suggests that Macartney actually performed privately the ceremony for the emperor and 
performed some hybridized form in public that was fairly indistinguishable from the actual 
ceremony (Platt 158-64). In any case, the issue does not seem to have then troubled the Qing 
as much as the British, the suspicion being that the British had become obsessed with an 
important though not crucial detail of Qing guest ritual. The only people who knew for sure 
were those actually present at the time and two of them were still alive and present in China 
the reigning Jiaqing emperor (thirty-two years old in 1793) and Sir George Thomas Staunton 
(twelve years old in 1793). It is now the veracity of Staunton, who denied the full kowtow 
was performed by Macartney, that is most open to question. Staunton, according to Amherst, 
“merely hinted at the imperfect recollection which he could retain of transactions which took 
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place so long ago, and at so early a period of his life”.1 Staunton, however, later confided to 
Amherst that Macartney had indeed performed “a polite hybrid,” repeating the ceremony of 
prostrations nine times though probably on one rather than two knees (Platt 161). 
The Amherst Embassy was only the second British embassy to visit China but 
technically the fourth to be sent. The first official British mission to attempt to approach 
China was organised in Calcutta not London by Warren Hastings, Governor-general of 
Bengal (Teltscher High Road to China). Hastings dispatched George Bogle to Tibet in 1774, 
but he did not cross into China. In 1788 the first embassy from the British mainland to China 
was aborted when its ambassador, Lt-Colonel Charles Cathcart died en route (Morse 2.151-
170). It was not until 1793 that Macartney finally arrived at the imperial court of the Qianlong 
Emperor for his more celebrated and critically discussed visit.2 To a great extent, until very 
recently, scholars of British literature and culture have largely ignored the Amherst embassy 
twenty-three years later in their accounts of early nineteenth century and its place in the lead 
up to the First Opium War of 1839-42. For the Chinese, this war marks the beginning of their 
highly traumatic “Century of National Humiliation” (bǎinián guóchǐ) that concluded in 1949 
with the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China (Callahan).  
 Comparatively little has been written about Amherst’s embassy, either from the 
British or the Chinese viewpoints. It has tended to be largely viewed, when it is noted at all, 
as a farcical repetition of its more famous predecessor.3 The embassy along with the two 
earlier British attempts to take possession of the Portuguese enclave of Macao in 1802 and 
1808, however, demands the serious attention of both historians and critics of the cultural 
relations between China and Britain in the nineteenth century. Wensheng Wang’s major 
 
1 Amherst to George Canning, February 12, 1817. PRO 17/3/59. Platt, 160. 
2 Influential discussions include: Hevia, Cherishing Men; Peyrefitte, Clash of Two 
Civilizations, and Porter, Ideographia, pp. 193-24. 
3 For the details of the embassy, see Morse 3. 256-306; Gao, “Amherst embassy”; Min; 
Peyrefitte, 504-111; and Hevia, Cherishing Men, pp. 210-18. 
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reappraisal of the reforming reign of the Jiaqing Emperor (1796-1820) presents a more 
complex and nuanced account of this crucial period in Chinese history (White Lotus Rebels). 
Whereas H. B. Morse referred to “the degenerate and corrupt court” of 1816 Wang describes 
a frugal, thoughtful, self-critical and reforming monarch, keenly aware of the two British 
attempts to take over Macao and nervous about their power (3.258). When Macartney visited 
China in 1793 it was nearing the end of the prosperous Qianlong era. When Amherst arrived, 
the empire was suffering severe problems, subject to overpopulation, land shortages, frequent 
rebellions and serious financial issues. It was also at this time, as Zheng Yangwen has 
demonstrated, that opium consumption in China was transformed from a largely elite cultural 
practice into popular activity, arguably due to the increasing supply of the drug from British 
controlled Bengal, used by the Company to recuperate huge amounts of silver bullion paid to 
the Chinese to fuel the more beneficial but also growing British addiction to tea (41-65; 
Trocki, Opium, Empire 33-57; Lovell, Opium War 32-33). Wang argues that the Jiaqing 
Emperor successfully enforced two major British climb downs over Macao and his 
subsequent, strict treatment of the Amherst embassy was intended to confirm imperial 
strength in the face of opportunistic British aggression. James L. Hevia similarly comments 
that “the Jiaqing court reviewed the historical record of the embassy, took tensions in Canton 
into account, and organized the greeting and preparation phase of Guest Ritual accordingly” 
(Cherishing Men 220). Stephen Platt, in the most detailed history of Sino-British relations in 
the early nineteenth century yet, argues that neither side expected the embassy to end in 
failure and though the British would come to blame Jiaqing’s arrogance, “the emperor very 
much wanted to have a successful meeting, even if it meant compromising on the external 
trappings of ceremony” and was “disappointed that the British visit failed to result in a 
friendly audience,” yet, “no matter how each side tried to paper it over, the Amherst mission 
was a catastrophe” (Imperial Twilight 169, 170; 148-74) The Jiaqing Emperor emerges from 
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historical enquiry not as a decadent, weak or petulant ruler imprisoned within an ossified 
ritualistic ceremonialism, but one who was capable of reacting pragmatically to the complex, 
challenging and rapidly changing political landscape that confronted him. The choices facing 
the increasingly beleaguered emperor, however, were uncomfortable and dangerous. 
 Contemporary responses to the earlier Macartney embassy were certainly mixed. 
Macartney and his admirers regarded his embassy as something of a personal diplomatic 
triumph. He claimed his mission “laid a foundation of amity, good offices, and immediate 
intercourse with the Imperial Court” (cited Pritchard, ‘Kowtow’ 375). Contemporary views of 
the Amherst embassy, however, generally viewed it as a failure. Henry Ellis, deputy 
commissioner, concluded that “the failure of both [embassies] has been complete” (437). John 
Crawfurd reviewing Ellis” Journal of the Proceedings of the late Embassy to China in the 
Edinburgh Review agreed that “everybody who knew anything of the matter, we believe, was 
prepared for that catastrophe of this new Chinese mission, which actually ensue.” (Edinburgh 
Review 29 [1818], 433). Eun Kyung Min argued that the various narratives of the embassy 
wrestled with “the added burden of interpreting the history of their failed mission to open up 
trade with China […] by attempting to sort out the convolutions of commerce, civility, and 
ceremony”. (Min 162) Patrick Tuck charged that the embassy “was not merely a failure, it 
was a fiasco” (‘Introduction’ to Staunton, Notes viii). Lo-shu Fu, however, while regarding 
the embassy as an unambiguous diplomatic failure, draws attention to the new knowledge that 
was gained of the northern Chinese coast and especially of Korea, surveyed by the embassy’s 
ships while Amherst journeyed overland to and from the Qing court and disseminated in John 
Macleod (or “M”Leod”) and Basil Hall’s narratives (403). The importance of these narratives 
which we are only just coming to appreciate is featured in Elizabeth Chang’s important new 
essay on the subject in this volume. Gao Hao stresses the importance of the embassy’s 
discoveries in China after the official proceedings were concluded (“Amherst Embassy”  
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571). The embassy was granted unprecedented and unexpected freedom of movement during 
its four-month journey from Beijing to Guangzhou (Canton), taking a different route from that 
of Macartney’s 1793 return, one that had not previously been taken by a Briton. Macartney’s 
mission travelled to the Southern end of the Grand Canal, whereas Amherst’s party 
transferred from Guazhou to the Yangtze River. They sailed 285 miles along the Yangtze to 
Poyang Lake and from there on smaller inland waterways to Guangzhou.  
 Britons were thus allowed to visit parts of the lower Yangtze delta hitherto unexplored 
by Europeans. As Amherst wrote to Canning, the embassy enjoyed “a greater degree of 
liberty than has been granted to any former embassy”.4 The members of the embassy were 
also able to communicate more fully with the Chinese people than they had hitherto under the 
jealously guarded Macartney embassy, rambling in the countryside, visiting cities and towns, 
purchasing souvenirs, even playing the first game of cricket in China. At times more like 
tourists than guests, the embassy gathered valuable first-hand knowledge of China. John 
Barrow, in the Quarterly Review, commented not entirely unapprovingly that they “frequently 
ran riot, and rambled to considerable distances from the line of their route” (21 [1819] 74). 
The information that they gained about the country would provide useful intelligence as Gao 
argues, such “important perceptions laid the foundation for future changes in Sino-British 
relations and led, indirectly, to the outbreak of the first Opium War in 1839.” (“Amherst 
Embassy”, p. 587) The strategic and formal mission of the embassy was not accomplished, 
yet it was of major importance in influencing British views of China in the lead up to the War 
and, arguably, marked the first major event taken in that process. Henry Ellis came to the 
conclusion that, “if ever impression is to be produced at Pekin, it must be from an intimate 
knowledge of our political and military strength, rather than from the gratification produced in 
the Emperor’s mind by the reception of an embassy (438). 
 
4 Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 8 March 1817. IOR G/12/197, f.281. 
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 The Macartney embassy lead to the publication of some fifteen or so accounts, the 
Amherst embassy also produced a similar number of contemporary narratives published or 
unpublished by eleven of its members.5 The official account, authored by Henry Ellis was 
published in (1817) and widely reviewed. Amherst’s journal which would have been the key 
account, was lost in the shipwreck of the Alceste though his many detailed letters sent back to 
London survive. Clarke Abel’s Narrative focusing on natural history was published in 1818. 
Abel also lost his valuable collection of natural history specimens and other materials in the 
wreck. Accounts of the extensive and highly important exploratory voyages of the ships while 
the embassy was ongoing were published by naval personnel John McLeod (1817) and Basil 
Hall (1818), containing the first substantive British discussion of Korean culture. The 
embassy’s lead interpreter, the British missionary Robert Morrison, contributed a briefer 
memoir in 1820. Its deputy, George Thomas Staunton, authored a substantial, but privately 
circulated account printed for a limited audience of politicians and company personnel only 
later in 1824 (presumably in deference to Ellis). When aged twelve he had served as 
Macartney’s page on the first embassy and was the son of Macartney’s deputy, George 
Leonard Staunton. It was not until 1841, some twenty four years after the outbreak of 
hostilities with China, that John Francis Davis, Company man and another interpreter on the 
embassy published by far the best written and most significant account, his, two volume 
account of the embassy’s progress and failure, Sketches of China. But that was during a very 
different phase in Sino-British relations. 
 The embassy originated in an attempt to address a series of specific grievances about 
the Canton system and the trade with China (most of which were resolved by the time of its 
arrival in China) (Morse 3. 279-284; IOR G12/196 f. 195-97). The ambitious aims of 
 
5 Other accounts include: “Henry Hayne Diary 1816-1817” and Martin, “Journal of Sir 
William Fanshawe Martin.” 
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Macartney’s embassy to establish full diplomatic relations, exchange ambassadors, establish 
open ports and an island warehouse were dispensed with. All that was wanted was some kind 
of sympathetic arrangement between the Company and Beijing and a general freeing up of the 
trade. The East India Company financed the embassy and it was in its interests that it was 
dispatched. John Barrow, who had served as comptroller on Macartney’s embassy, now 
elevated to the powerful position of second secretary at the Admiralty had canvassed a sequel 
to Macartney’s embassy enthusiastically in 1805. In 1815, however, the times seemed 
especially propitious. Britain had just defeated its major continental rival, the Napoleonic 
Empire, and its future as a global trading and imperial power seemed assured. As Stephen 
Platt argues, “[t]he East India Company could start planning for the world after the peace, and 
independently of anything happening at canton, the directors wanted to make sure that France 
didn’t send a postwar embassy to China before Britain did .... the two British missions would 
thus be bookends around the long era of war with France” (150). In 1815 Barrow thus 
proposed to the government “a Mission to the Court of Pekin, in order to announce the 
restoration of a general peace in this quarter of the World; and of congratulating the Emperor 
upon his recent escape from assassination.”6 The Chinese needed to be aware that Great 
Britain was now by far the dominant military and commercial power in the western 
hemisphere (and the subcontinent of India) and powerful there as Qing China was in the 
eastern. 
 The embassy because it never achieved an audience with the emperor, entered into any 
substantial negotiations, or concluded any agreements, may have been regarded as a complete 
failure. Yet at least two of the embassy’s participants, Davis and Staunton, would later both 
view it as leading to a distinct improvement in trading conditions and thus, paradoxically, a 
 
6 “Minute of Secret Court of the Directors held on Wednesday the 22nd February 1815”. IOR 
G12/196, f.44. 
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success because it was a formal failure, thus problematizing any simple understanding of 
‘success” or “failure”. (Davis, The Chinese 1.181; Staunton, Memoirs 67-68) As a Company 
employee, Davis supported the advice of Staunton that the performance of the kowtow 
ceremonial was unlikely to achieve anything positive, and would only have negative 
consequences for the Company at Canton. His Sketches, however, indicates that there might 
have been a much more pragmatic motivation in the British resistance to perform the full 
ceremonial. He writes that because “there seemed so little prospect of succeeding in anything, 
that it became a question whether the point of ceremony might not be the best to break off 
upon, since it would involve no article of negotiation, but be a good mode of asserting our 
independence, without making other matters worse than they were before” (1. 55-56). He 
argues that they ‘should gain nothing more with compliance than we could gain without it” 
and that he “instead of gaining any points by such measure, we should only become 
contemptible in the eyes of the Chinese, and in fact do ourselves more harm than good 
(1.109)”. The negotiations over the ceremonial proved an unambiguous object lesson for 
Davis for what he understood to be Qing diplomacy: the Chinese are “too proud to learn any 
thing about us, while we foreigners study them in every relation of life, and have availed 
ourselves to some purpose the opportunities (scanty as these may have comparatively been), 
which years of intercourse afforded us.” He indicates that this embassy, like that of 
Macartney’s was an opportunity to acquire “that “power” which consists in “Knowledge”.” 
However, what he claims to know and understand are not the subtleties of complex Qing 
guest ritual, but a stereotypical understanding that “the most complete faith, the most 
unblushing perfidy, is one part of the Chinese system in their negotiations with strangers” (1. 
109). Davis was subsequently appointed second superintendent of British trade in China 
alongside the luckless Lord Napier in December 1833. After Napier’s death in 1834, he 
briefly became chief superintendent before resigning this position in January 1835. In 1844 he 
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was appointed as the second governor and commander-in-chief of the new British colony of 
Hong Kong. By this time, he had established himself as Britain’s major sinologist of the mid-
century. In his The Chinese: A General Description of China and its Inhabitants (1836; 
1851), Davis concluded that: 
 
It has often been a subject of just remark, that this unsuccessful mission was followed 
by a longer interval of tranquillity and freedom from Chinese annoyances, than had ever 
been experienced before. From the year 1816 to 1829 not a single stoppage of the 
British trade took place, except in the affair of the Topaze frigate in 1822; and there the 
Canton government was glad to make the first advances to a resumption of the 
suspended intercourse (1. 81). 
 
Davis’s conclusion was similar to that of Amherst himself who expressed his shock that “the 
circumstances attending these transactions were of so extraordinary a nature, so little to be 
accounted for by the usages of European Courts, or even by the practices adopted on the 
occasion of the last Embassy to the Emperor of China.”  He complained that “the decorum, 
and the deliberation with which everything relating to the court ceremonies during the time of 
the late Emperor Tchien Lung appears to have been arranged and conducted” were dispensed 
with in favour of “hurry and confusion, of irregularity and disorder, of insult, inhumanity and 
almost personal violence, sufficient to give the court of the Emperor Kea-king the manners, 
character, and appearance of the roving camp of a Tartar Horde.” Surveying a detailed 
description of the ceremonials to be required from him by the Jiaqing court and the wish of 
the court to send his embassy away after a mere six days, Amherst concludes that it was 
unlikely that the embassy could have proceeded, and that the breaking off over the issue of the 
kowtow represented the best outcome in which both sides could claim some degree of face 
 12 
saving. He concludes that the number and frequency of kowtows required and the brusque 
manner of their demand would have rendered compliance impossible.  
 
But with us, all was hurry and precipitation. A total disregard of everything relating to 
the comfort of the individuals. An absolute banishment of decorum from public 
transactions. An unceasing attempt to hurry us into acts without a moment for reflection 
or deliberation. In short, a pervading wish to remove away from us every thing that 
constitutes the splendor or event the respectable appearance of an Embassy, and finally 
an attempt to drag us before the Emperor in such a guise as would befit only his vassals 
from the meanest and most barbarous island of the China seas.7 
 
 Detailed historical scholarship into the motivation of the Jiaqing court in its conduct of 
the embassy is not yet available to anything like the same extent for the Amherst embassy as 
for the Macartney embassy, so in attempting to explain the reasons for what the British 
viewed as the apparent hardening, if that it was it was, of the Chinese position regarding the 
ceremonial treatment of the embassy, we are required to speculate somewhat.8 It does appear 
that the Jiaqing court initially took a much less generous and flexible approach with 
Amherst’s embassy subjecting it to a more rigorous ceremonial. Additionally, the court 
wished the embassy to leave almost immediately after the audience in contravention of the 
prescribed forty-day residence. Yet, the Jiaqing Emperor’s noted frugality and the difficult 
economic times that China was experiencing are entirely sufficient to explain his wish to see 
the back of this extremely costly visit (Ellis 432). In the end, Amherst stayed some five 
months and this residence may have cost the Chinese court something like £170,000 (Davis, 
 
7 Letter to George Canning, 8th March 1817. IOR G/12/197, ff. 285-299. 
8 The most important English language source of Chinese documents relating to the Jiaqing 
reign in remains Fu’s A Documentary History of Sino-Western. For Chinese sources, see 
Lovell 425-7; Wang, White Lotus Rebels 261-63. 
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Sketches 1.81) roughly the same as that of Macartney. Given the difficulties that the empire 
was facing, an embassy from troublesome foreigners was probably the last thing the court 
needed. In any case, in terms of China’s past and current history foreigners at Canton would 
be a minor, if irritating, concern. But the reason for the embassy’s treatment is probably more 
easily explained by the Jiaqing Emperor’s wish to appear firm and decisive in the wake of 
British aggression in Macao and its leading participation in the booming illegal trade in 
opium. In an edict back in 14 November 1808, the emperor determined that the British must 
leave Macao describing them as “proud, tyrannical and generally obnoxious! [...] When the 
barbarians dare to occupy the strategic spots of our frontier, we must not show the least sign 
of weakness or cowardice!” In an edict of 30 June 1809, the emperor described the British as 
“always unreasonable and dishonest” adding that “we have been too lenient with them. From 
now on, we must make amends and be more severe” (Fu 371, 377). The Chinese were 
especially suspicious of Staunton. The emperor decreed on 8 January 1815 that when he 
accompanied Macartney’s embassy as a boy, Staunton showed himself to be “young and 
crafty, and throughout the return journey drew maps of all strategic spots of the mountains 
and rivers he passed through.” He suspected that “probably in the long run he will make 
trouble” and that he may have been involved in the recent incident involving HMS Doris” 
capture of an American schooner, Hunter, in Chinese waters (394). Britain and the USA had 
been at war from 1812-1815 and this conflict spread to Chinese territory. The court believed 
unfairly that Staunton had amassed substantial personal wealth and property at Canton though 
bribery and corruption. Though by this time he was in receipt of an annual salary of £20,000 
as leader of the factory in Canton and had established his personal fortune (Platt 148-49, 152-
53). In 1816 the emperor was petitioned for help by the Rajah of Nepal against the British in 
Bengal, warning of their designs on Tibet (Fu 401-2, 616). The emperor refused any aid but 
secretly strengthened Chinese defences on the Tibetan and Nepalese border in response (Ellis 
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438). From around this time, the court was increasingly aware of and concerned about 
burgeoning Chinese opium use and even its consumption by officers of the imperial guard and 
court eunuchs (Fu 616). In April 1810, the emperor decreed that “opium is a poison, 
undermining our good customs and morality” and that, lately, “the purchasers and eaters of 
opium have become numerous”, issuing orders to suppress the trade (380). In March 1811, 
the emperor decreed that “opium from the overseas countries has infiltrated into the interior 
and has caused so much harm [. …] This item, opium spreads deadly poison. Rascals and 
bandits indulge in it and cannot do without it even for a second” and that it was supplied by 
“treacherous merchants” (381).  In January 1815 the Chinese government adopted new 
measures to prohibit the trade, the emperor declaring, “Opium spreads its poison intensively” 
and claiming that it “is usually smuggled in by barbarian ships”. The emperor was also aware 
that because of the trade silver was draining out of the country and “a serious deficit in the 
national revenue” was occurring (399-400).  
 It seems clear than that at the time of the embassy, the emperor regarded the British as 
troublesome, potentially dangerous, and possessed of an insatiable appetite for trading, 
especially in opium. His response was rational and pragmatic if, ultimately, counter-
productive. Yet though he wished to appear firm, the emperor remained very pragmatic. Platt 
has argued that he wanted the embassy to proceed successfully and was much more “willing 
to accommodate them than they knew.” He had informed the Duke to be flexible about 
ceremony writing “do not be so severe and exacting about ceremonials that you lose track of 
the etiquette for managing foreigners.” He added with a degree of coolness and insight seldom 
acknowledged in British accounts (and historical accounts more generally) that “it was just 
like this in 1793, and we made the best of the situation then. Generally speaking, it is better to 
meet with them than to send them away” (quoted Platt 169). Neither Chinese nor British were 
fully aware of the situation that was beyond both their respective conceptual worldviews and 
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there was clearly an unfortunate element of unnecessary cultural misunderstanding and 
suspicion among the parties. This was a period enormous uncertainty and anxiety for both 
empires, as Wang puts it, “British policy toward China, aiming to find out how the vast 
empire might be pressured, was tentative and experimental and could have gone in different 
directions” (250, 235-51). Chinese policy was also uncertain, which probably accounts for the 
emperor’s later self-critical public acceptance of responsibility for the misunderstanding 
relating to the hurried audience.  
 Amherst came to the conclusion that, given the expectations of the imperial court, 
even had the audience gone ahead it is unlikely anything worthwhile would have been 
achieved. 
 
I cannot think that His Imperial Majesty’s intentions with regard to the present 
Embassy, would have satisfied the expectations of the British Government, as of the 
Honorable Company more immediately interested in the success of this mission, or 
would have appeared in the eyes of Europe either as an honourable or an amicable 
reception. I cannot flatter myself that confined to very limited a period of time, and 
subject to the will of a Man of most untoward personal character, it would have been 
possible for me or for those who acted with me to have obtained any thing that might be 
considered as an adequate return, either of honour or advantage for the compliment paid 
to the Emperor by the scale and composition of the present Embassy […]9 
 
He regarded the emperor’s adoption of a strict policy regarding the ceremonial aspect of the 
court as stemming from weakness rather than from strength. 
 
 
9 Letter to George Canning, 22 March, 1817. IOR G12/197, f .310. 
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I conceive that no Foreign Embassador is likely to be admitted into the presence of the 
Emperor Kia-King, unless he agrees to perform, to its full extent, the Tartar Ceremony 
of the Ko-tou. Perhaps the present Emperor, whose reign has been frequently and very 
lately disturbed by insurrections of his subjects, may less readily dispense with outward 
forms of respect than his Father, whose reign was long and victorious, and, who, being 
firm in the possession of real power and authority, might attach less consequence to any 
show of external homage.10 
 
Faced with British attempts to encroach at Macao, their prosecution of an expanding trade in 
opium, and the infringement of Chinese territorial waters in their disputes with France and 
later the US, the Jiaqing court, which never solicited or encouraged this embassy to be sent, 
chose to deploy a stricter usage of Qing guest ritual than that of the Qianlong Emperor and, 
reluctantly, to countenance the dismissal of the embassy though that dismissal resulted from 
Amherst’s withdrawal from the audience, not from his refusal to kowtow. 
It has frequently been remarked that Qing China does not feature as prominently in our 
standard accounts of the cultural history of Romanticism as might be expected and several 
scholars have attempted to redress this balance. However, even so, there are comparatively 
few references to China in those poets whom we have traditionally thought of as canonically 
romantic. Yet those few references, as the essays by Coffey and Murray in this collection 
show, are extremely suggestive and pointed, indicating that the view of China deployed in 
those accounts became the most influential one during the expansion of the opium trade with 
China in the prelude to the First Opium War of 1840. For example, in Biographia Literaria of 
1817, Coleridge wrote of “the immense empire of China improgressive for thirty centuries” 
(2. 137) and Shelley, in his Preface to “Hellas” of 1822, opined that had it not been for its 
 
10 Letter to George Canning, 21 April, 1817. IOR G12/197, f. 378. 
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origins in Hellenic culture, Europe would have “arrived at such a miserable state of social 
institutions as China and Japan possess” (ix, 58). Byron in 1822 claimed that in China “they 
have found out the miserable happiness of a stationary & unwarlike mediocrity” (Selected 
Letters 271). More intriguing and enigmatic is John Keats’ observation in a letter to John 
Taylor of 5 September 1819 in which he subtly explores the relationship between character 
and environment, one of the abiding preoccupation in romantic medicine since the 
experiments of Thomas Beddoes at his Pneumatic Institute in Bristol with Coleridge, Southey 
and Humphrey Davy. Keats, however, takes a sharp turn to the east after discoursing on the 
healthy chalky soil and dry airs at Winchester where he was working on “Lamia”.  
 
The cultivation of the earth in a great measure—Our hea[l]th temperament and 
disposition are taken more (notwithstanding the contradiction of the history of cain and 
abel) from the air we breathe, than is generally imagined. See the difference between a 
Peasant and a Butcher. I am convinced a great cause of it is the difference of the air they 
breathe--The one takes his mingled with the fume of slaughter, the other with the damp 
exhalement from the glebe--The teeming damp that comes from the plough furrow is of 
great effect in taming the fierceness of a strong Man than his labour--let him be mowing 
a furze upon a Mountain and at the day’s end his thoughts will run upon a withe axe if 
he ever had handled one; let him leave the Plough and he will think qu[i]etly of his 
supper--Agriculture is the tamer of men; the steam from the earth is like drinking their 
Mother’s milk—It enervates their nature. This appears a great cause of the imbecility of 
the Chinese. And if this sort of atmosphere is a mitigation to the energy of a strong man; 
how much more must it injure a weak one—unoccupied--unexercised—For what is the 
cause of so many men maintaining a good state in Cities, but occupation—An idle man, 
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a man who is not sensitively alive to self-interest in a city cannot continue long in good 
Health (Letters 2.156) 
 
Here tantalizingly recalling Saturn’s somnolent embrace of the earth, “his ancient mother” in 
The Fall of Hyperion and his soporific personification of Autumn in the Ode, Keats” 
suggestive postulation of some relationship between a people’s moral character and the 
agrarian state of their economy probably also derives in some measure from the fallout from 
Amherst embassy and its generally more negative and downbeat representation of the peoples 
and cultures of the heavily agrarian Qing empire and its endless steaming water-filled paddy 
fields of rice.  
 As well as his satirical versifications on the Macartney Embassy of 1793, discussed by 
Jennifer Hargrave in this volume, the now eighty-year old satirist John Wolcot (“Peter 
Pindar”) chose to update his view of Chinese arrogance from the times of the Macartney 
embassy. Wolcot is now more pessimistic about the idea of cultural exchange that he played 
with in his earlier satires. This verse marks a serious change in his earlier satire. Whereas 
previously he could regard, somewhat mischievously, the Qianlong Emperor with his love of 
poetry as the “Peter Pindar” of China, the present occupant of the throne of China (and the 
Regent for that matter) are vulgar despots. 
 
"Descendant of the Great Kien Long, 
   Immortal for his Lyric song,  
The Peter Pindar of the China Bards;  
Why Amherst so disgrace, and Staunton, 
Like fools dismissing them to Canton  
How very badly thou hast play’d thy cards!  
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"Nine times knock heads !—a sad prostration !—  
Degraded, lo! the British Nation,  
Had Amherst yielded to thy proud commands:—  
To Kings tho’ Britons deign to truckle,  
Once—and once only—down they knuckle,  
Whene’er indulged at Levees to kiss hands 
 "Inform me what their crying sin,  
That thou shouldst banish them Pekin? (Critical Review 5 [1817] 479) 
 
Wolcot points out the disparity between the former poet-emperor Qianlong and the present 
emperor, neither immortal nor a bard. He continues in this vein satirising the Regent for his 
fondness for exotic chinoiserie. “Toads, frogs, and snakes, and lizards crawl,/To rival the rich 
scenes of Yving-ming!”. The regent will indeed be sorely disappointed at the lack of presents 
the court will receive from the emperor who foolishly underrates the power of the British:  
 
"Thou never didst vouchsafe, perhaps, 
To cast thine eye sublime on Maps; 
And therefore, fancying thyself all-mighty,  
Has treated us with pompous scorn— 
Beneath thy notice—beggars born—  
No better than the folks of Otaheite!  
"Know, should Old England’s Genius frown,  
Her thunder soon would shake thy crown,  
Reduce thee from an eagle to a wren;  
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Thine high Imperial pride to gall,  
Force thee to leap the Chinese wall,  
To feed on horse with Tartar tribes again (481). 
 
Ironically, the Chinese had an enormous interest in cartography and the British maps were 
among the few gifts that the emperor was to accept from the British, for good reasons. These 
several suggestive yet on the while epiphanic or limited epiphanic references to China are all 
published shortly after the return of the embassy and at the time that accounts of its frustrating 
progress were beginning to circulate in the mainstream media of the times, though Keats 
could not then have access to a copy of  Ellis’ published account which appeared later in the 
year. 
The house of Murray was Britain’s leading publisher of travel and exploration 
accounts in the Romantic period and beyond. John Murray II (1778-1843), especially, had a 
strong interest in these subjects. Since 1813, the publishing house had acted as the official 
publisher to the Admiralty and so undertook the publication of most of the accounts of British 
expeditions. As well as publishing travel narratives about China, Murray (II and III) also 
published a series of very important, pioneering translations of Chinese literature by the East 
India Company writer at Guangzhou (Canton), John Francis Davis. Davis, aged twenty-three, 
acted as a junior interpreter with Amherst’s embassy, publishing his own history of the 
embassy in later in 1842 as Sketches of China though with the London publisher Charles 
Knight, rather than Murray. Davis’s important and engaging translation of the Chinese 
comedy Laou-Sang-Urh, or, “An Heir in His Old Age.” A Chinese Drama (by Hanchen Wu) 
which deals with issues relating to marriage, inheritance, filial piety and ancestor worship was 
published by Murray in 1817. In March of 1817, Murray wrote to Byron about how he had 
“just published a Drama translated direct from the Chinese, which is curious & rather 
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interesting for its views of Manners” (Letters 207), As Davis began to establish himself as the 
leading expert on both China and Chinese literature in the wake of the Amherst embassy, 
Murray also published his Chinese Novels, translated from the Originals: to which are added 
Proverbs and Moral Maxims (1822), Hien Wun Shoo. Chinese Moral Maxims (1823), the 
very fine and poignant Chinese tragedy Han Koong Tsew or the Sorrows of Han (1829), and 
most importantly his major translation of the seventeenth-century Chinese novel, Hao Ch’iu 
Chuan. The Fortunate Union (1829).  Davis’ Chinese Miscellanies of 1865 which collected 
his thoughts and opinions on matters Chinese was published by Murray III in 1865. Murray 
was to have published Davis’ major work on China, The Chinese in 1835 but, instead, this 
was published by Charles Knight, though Murray III published the second edition in 1857. 
This was easily the most important work of British sinology prior to that of the missionary 
and sinologist and first professor of Chinese at Oxford (1876), James Legge.  
John Murray as we know from the many letters written to him by Byron was very 
much a hands-on and highly interventionist editor and publisher, and his many letters to the 
poet are full of gossipy detail about his other current publishing activities. He was also a very 
interested person, holding strong views on many subjects and thus an important, indirect but 
not obvious opinion former on many subjects, including China. Murray also published the 
Quarterly Review from 1809 onwards where his and other published works on China were 
extensively reviewed by his friend Sir John Barrow, second secretary of the Admiralty. 
Barrow had served on the Macartney Embassy as a comptroller and was the originator and 
champion of the Amherst Embassy of 1816, somewhat generously as the British expert on 
China, a view he enjoyed cultivating. 
In his letter of March 1817, Murray wrote that he wishes he could show Byron 
“extracts from the Peking Gazettes in which the Chinese speak of our Embassy – such 
contempt—we have got near to them by means of Nepaul [sic] & before I die I hope we shall 
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have a war with them” (Letters 207). Murray’s wish was granted. He died in 1843, a year 
after the conclusion of the First Opium War with China. These explicitly pugnacious and 
belligerent comments are most uncharacteristic of British public opinion of the time. Even in 
the late 1830s, prior to the outbreak of war, what we might call the war party in Britain was 
limited, mainly centring on the opium merchant community and its proxies (see Chen). When 
it finally broke out, the war was justified not as a means of protecting the illegal opium trade, 
but as a response to Commissioner Lin’s robust policies and illegal imprisonment of British 
merchants in their factories. Murray’s tough stance towards China is occasioned by his 
reading of extracts translated from the official Chinese newssheet, the Peking Gazette, and 
published in Ellis’s account of the embassy (Ellis 493-510).  
That Murray thought this way in 1817 as a result of his reading and publication of Ellis 
account deserves especial critical notice. In a subsequent letter to Byron of 9 September 1817, 
Murray tells Byron that he has come to London with “his hands full”. He is preparing to 
publish two major official accounts of the Embassy. Actually he was to publish three: that of 
Henry Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China; John M’Leod’s 
Narrative of a Voyage, in his Majesty’s late Ship Alceste to the Yellow Sea, and also Captain 
Basil Hall’s Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea (1818). The latter 
two and their complex publication history are extensively discussed in Elizabeth Chang’s 
essay in this volume. The news of the embassy’s failure in being summarily dismissed from 
the capital by the Jiaqing emperor without an official audience was now well known. The 
Alceste had also been involved in a hostile engagement with a Chinese fort along the coast. It 
is likely that Murray’s animosity to China was as a result of the reporting of these events. In 
the letter of 9 September, he writes to Byron that he is, 
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Preparing two accounts of the unfortunate China Expedition of which I know no less 
that Eight  have been written by Lord Amherst, Sir Geo Staunton – Mr Davies [sic] (an 
able young Man who understands the Language) Capt Hall – Mr Morrison the 
Interpreter –  Mr Abel – Naturalist - Mr Mc Leod – Surgeon & last but not least Mr Ellis 
(Ld Buckinghamshires Son – who was the second in the Embassy) – the last I am 
publishing & the other is announced (Murray 245-46). 
 
Ellis’s largely unsympathetic Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy with its serious 
lack of cultural empathy thus, because of the prestige of Murray’s publishing house and its 
connections with the admiralty and government rather unfortunately, became the key 
document for interpreting the embassy and establishing the decline in prestige of the Chinese 
empire Keighren, Withers, Bell 554,-55, 238). Intended originally solely “for the eye of 
private friendship” (Ellis 39), in the absence of the publication of Amherst’s journal (lost in 
the wreck of the Alceste), it became the de facto official version of events once published by 
Murray. Though Amherst’s extensive letters of report sent back to Canning could have made 
the basis of an official account, he seems to have been unenthused by the prospect, perhaps 
not wishing to be reminded because of the circumstances of the embassy’s dismissal. Thus, 
the embassy lacked the many more vibrant and exciting narratives that appeared after 
Macartney’s embassy. Ellis noted that a British embassy to China was “so rare an event in the 
history of Europe that a correct narrative of the occurrences attending it possesses a degree of 
interest, almost independent of the mode in which the narrative may be executed” (iii). Thus 
as Keighren, Withers and Bell comment, such a “declaration is all the more important given 
the failure of this official mission” (54).  
Ellis had little interest in China. He was, as Murray significantly points out to Byron, 
the illegitimate son of Robert Hobart, 4th Earl of Buckinghamshire and very powerful 
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president of the Board of Control (1812-1816) which managed and supervised the Company 
for the government. At twenty-eight years old when the embassy occurred, Ellis thus owed his 
place on the embassy to patronage. Though having spent over ten years as both a Company 
and government agent in India and Persia he emerges as a rather jejeune and cynical presence. 
He regarded the issue of the kowtow as essentially unimportant, while admitting the 
ceremony was simply to “oriental barbarism” he believed that it was a point of “etiquette” that 
might have been easily complied with rather than sacrifice the entire objects of the embassy 
(Ellis 51), a view applauded by free traders such as John Crawfurd reviewing the book in 
1818 for the Edinburgh Review, that the ceremony did not appear “much more humiliating 
than other court ceremonies” and the negotiations to avoid it were simply “absurd” 
(Edinburgh Review 29, [1817] 436-7). He had little of the genuine passion for and 
understanding of Chinese history and culture of Staunton or Davis, regarding China simply as 
a “peculiar but uninteresting nation” (Ellis 491). Originally, placed as second commissioner 
after Amherst he was demoted to third after a miffed George Staunton objected to his third 
placing in the embassy hierarchy.  
Ellis was certainly out of sympathy with Qing China. Experiencing the empire during 
the notorious year without summer that saw the creation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
(1818) occasioned by the momentous 1815 eruption of Mount Tambora (Markley), he was not 
at all impressed. He writes that his journal can add little to those accounts already published 
as “centuries have produced less change in China than a generation in Europe” the subject is 
already exhausted. China as a subject appears to Ellis as “eminently deficient” (40) and what 
curiosity he had “was soon satiated and destroyed by the moral, political, and even local 
uniformity” (440). China “vast in its extent, produce and population, wants energy and 
variety: the chill of uniformity pervaded and deadens the whole” (40). In summing up this 
impression of China Ellis remarks that,  
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Those who have talents for observation, or powers of description, may possibly find 
wherewithal to occupy the mind and the pen. Millet fields, willow-groves, junks, half-
clothed inhabitants with little eyes and long tails, women with prettily-dressed hair but 
ugly faces, these are the daily and unchanging objects, and from these I cannot eke out 
anything like interesting description [....] Those who landed with an impression that the 
Chinese were to be classed with the civilised nations of Europe have no doubt seen reason 
to correct their opinion; those, on the contrary, who in their estimate ranked them with the 
other nations of Asia, will have seen little to surprise in the conduct either of the 
Government or of individuals. The leading characteristic feature is the influence of 
established usage. (197-98) 
 
Ellis finds himself unable to find much positive or significant to say about a land in which the 
only sublime element is the excessive smell of “horrid effluvia” proceeding from the persons 
of the Chinese (133-34). The mind of the Chinese as a whole is “treated like the feet of the 
women, cramped by the bandages of habit and education, till it acquires an unnatural 
littleness”. China is the land of conformity and sameness,” and the Chinese are a most 
uninteresting nation” (198). Ellis then presents the land not as the celestial or flowery empire 
of eighteenth-century chinoiserie fantasy but, instead, as an eastern Dunciad, an empire of 
dullness and a land of monotony. His final and influential summary of the state of China 
under the Jiaqing emperor makes this point”  
 
I have now exhausted my recollections respecting China and its inhabitants; and have only 
to ask myself, whether, omitting considerations of an official employment, my 
anticipations have been borne out by what I have experienced? The question is readily 
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answered in the affirmative; curiosity was soon satiated and destroyed by the moral, 
political, and even local uniformity; for whether plains or mountains, the scene in China 
retains the same aspect for such an extent, that the eye is wearied with the continuance of 
sublimity as of levelness .[...] I have neither experienced the refinement and comforts of 
civilized life, not the wild interest of most semi-barbarous countries, but have found my 
own mind and spirit influenced by the surrounding atmosphere of dullness and constraint 
(440). 
 
Ellis’s account was favourably reviewed by John Barrow in two substantial articles for the 
Quarterly Review for 1817, also published by Murray. Barrow praised Ellis for his demolition 
of the myth of Chinese civilization, arguing that Ellis had “revealed in its true light ... this 
government of sages, which Voltaire and his followers conspired to hold up as ... an example 
for the general admiration of mankind”. He argued that it was on the “refusal or compliance 
with this degrading and humiliating demand” that “England must continue to maintain, in the 
eyes of this haughty government, that high rank and independent spirit for which she had 
hitherto been known to them, or set the seal of vassalage to her submission, and be registered 
among the number of their petty tributaries” (Barrow 408, 412). To those at home who 
criticised Amherst’s pride in refusing to undertake the ceremony, Barrow claims that “it was 
this kind of pride, which, in the early days of England’s history raised her reputation in 
foreign courts, gained for her commerce substantial advantages, and made her alliance an 
object of solicitude” (33, 476). Throughout the narratives and their reception, the British 
emphasized virtues such as dignity, respect, firmness, and manliness and described the 
ceremony as abject, offensive, humiliating, disgusting, and debasing. They understood this as 
a clash between an open, brave, and manly British character and a haughty, arrogant, and 
insolent Chinese “character.” 
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The amplification of Ellis’s negative and opinionated view of China, through its 
presentation by the major publishing house of Murray, publisher of Byron, as the most 
important official account of the embassy and its subsequent review by Barrow in the 
Quarterly demonstrates how the publishing history of the Amherst embassy accounts came to 
be an important factor in that extraordinary reversal of China’s image in Britain from a 
prestigious eighteenth-century civilization to the nineteenth-century to the semi-barbarous 
state that we see vilified so viscerally in the writings of Thomas De Quincey, house writer for 
Blackwood’s. Nevertheless, Ellis seems to have been unhappy with having to publish his 
journal. Despite Barrow’s praise, it was badly reviewed in The Times which announced that 
commented that Clarke Abel’s forthcoming narrative would be much superior. On October 
19, 1817 Ellis wrote somewhat crabbily to Murray that “an individual has seldom committed 
an act so detrimental to his interests as I have done in this unfortunate publication; and I shall 
be too happy when the lapse of time will allow of my utterly forgetting the occurrence. I am 
already indifferent to literary criticism, and had almost forgotten Abel’s approaching 
competition” (Smiles 1.64). Murray, in his deprecated the severity of the criticisms of Ellis 
“who had done the best hat he could on a subject of exceeding interest”. Yet he wrote that he 
was “now printing Captain Hall’s account (he commanded the Lyra)” and that this was “one 
of the most delightful books I ever read, and it is calculated to heal the wound inflicted by 
poor Ellis” (Smiles 1, 64). Murray is not clear about the exact nature of the “wound” Ellis 
inflicted on the reading public. He probably had little choice to lead with Ellis’s account in the 
absence of anything from Amherst as the patronage of the earl of Buckinghamshire carried 
much weight and relegated George Thomas Staunton’s account to that of a limited and private 
audience. Abel’s and Hall’s accounts were easy to publish as they were authored by those of 
the naturalist and the explorer unconnected with the politics of the embassy. Murray, no 
doubt, had simply wanted a better and more engagingly written account to regale his 
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readership with the high drama of the embassy. It seems, however, that his view of the Qing 
empire was in many ways conditioned by the content and not the style of Ellis’ narrative. The 
actual “wound” that “poor Ellis” and his narrative really inflicted on the nineteenth-century 
perception of China, however, would be much deeper and more traumatic in the years leading 
up to the first Anglo-Chinese or “Opium War” of 1840-42. 
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